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Measuring the Effects 
of the September 11 Attack 
on New York City 
he attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 
2001, traumatized New York City and the nation. Almost 
3,000 lives were lost, and more than 30 million square feet of 
office space in Lower Manhattan was damaged or destroyed. 
The loss of workers, physical capital, and infrastructure reduced 
the productive potential of the city’s economy and disrupted 
the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. Damage to the 
transportation and communications infrastructure depressed 
economic activity for a number of months, especially in Lower 
Manhattan.
This article evaluates the short-term economic conse-
quences of the attack on Manhattan and the four other boroughs 
that make up New York City. We begin with the deepest loss—
that of human lives. We then look at the effects of the attack on 
the inputs to the production process: labor and capital. 
The attack led to an idling and underutilization of labor not 
only in the World Trade Center area, but also in other parts of 
the city. (Views of New York City and Lower Manhattan are 
provided in Appendix A.) Our analysis of labor focuses on 
aggregate city employment as well as on industry effects and 
factors that impact employee productivity, including health 
and confidence.1 The analysis of capital covers the destruction 
of commercial space and infrastructure. We also discuss the 
effects of the attack on the markets for office space, home 
construction, and home sales. Finally, we examine how the 
attack affected the city’s most economically vulnerable 
residents. 
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• The total cost of the September 11 attack on 
the World Trade Center—comprising earnings 
losses, property damage, and the cleanup 
and restoration of the site—is estimated to 
be between $33 billion and $36 billion through 
June 2002.
• The earnings losses consist of $7.8 billion 
in deceased workers’ prospective lifetime 
earnings and $3.6 billion to $6.4 billion in 
reduced wage and salary income in city 
industries affected by the attack. 
• The cost of cleaning up the site, replacing 
the destroyed World Trade Center buildings, 
and repairing damaged buildings and 
infrastructure is expected to reach 
$21.6 billion.
• Although the loss of life and disruption of 
activity temporarily reduced New York City’s 
productive capacity, the attack’s effects on 
employment and consumer confidence had 
largely run their course by mid-2002.
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This framework is an economic one, incorporating quality-
of-life issues. To pursue our analysis, we have restricted 
ourselves to the labor and capital markets. In theory, it should 
be possible to evaluate output and income losses directly. In 
practice, however, such an evaluation is unworkable because 
official tabulations of gross New York City product do not exist 
and income figures are reported with a considerable lag.2  Thus, 
output effects must be inferred from the behavior of the labor 
and capital markets. Whenever possible, we separate the effects 
of the attack from the effects of the business cycle (although we 
do not attempt to isolate the effects of the fall 2001 anthrax 
scares from the effects of the attack). Unless otherwise noted, 
the data presented here cover the period through June 2002, the 
end of the recovery process at the World Trade Center site.
We conclude that the attack disrupted New York City’s 
economy in many ways. Although it is difficult to put a dollar 
value on lives lost, it is also inappropriate to omit loss of life 
from an estimate of the damage sustained. Our intention is to 
present as complete a picture of the attack’s effects as possible. 
Accordingly, we estimate that the aggregate present value of 
lost lifetime earnings for these workers is about $7.8 billion. In 
addition, in the nine months following the attack, lost jobs and 
a reduction in the number of hours worked translated into an 
estimated shortfall in aggregate earnings of $3.6 billion to 
$6.4 billion. The cost of replacing the destroyed and damaged 
physical capital and infrastructure is estimated at $21.6 billion. 
Finally, the sum of these labor and capital losses yields an 
estimated total loss through June 2002 of between $33 billion 
and $36 billion.3
Loss of Life
The death of almost 3,000 people in the attack was a loss to 
New York City and to the nation. This number includes those 
who worked in the two World Trade Center towers, the 
firefighters and police personnel who responded to the attack, 
and the tourists and other visitors who were in the World 
Trade Center complex that morning. The method we use to 
value loss of life is based on the concept of “lifetime-earnings 
loss.” This method estimates individual economic losses by 
adding up a worker’s pretax annual income from the year of 
death to the year that he or she had expected to retire.4 For 
those who died in the attack, the estimated earnings loss is 
calculated by multiplying the average expected level of annual 
earnings by the average number of years left to work before 
retirement.5
We estimate workers who died in the attack earned, on 
average, $127,000 a year. This estimate is based on the average 
income in 2000 for all workers in Manhattan and all workers in 
the finance and insurance sectors in Manhattan. The average 
annual income for workers in the finance and insurance 
sectors—where about half of the deceased workers had been 
employed—is estimated to be $197,275 in 2002. The average 
annual income of all workers in Manhattan, excluding the two 
sectors, is estimated at $57,000.6 We use the average age of the 
workers killed in the attack, forty, and assume that they had 
twenty-two more years left to work until retirement. The 
average income of these workers is assumed to grow at the rate 
of inflation, which is assumed to equal the average discount 
rate. Under these assumptions, the current value of the 
aggregate earnings loss reaches about $7.8 billion, or an average 
of $2.8 million per worker.7
Although private insurance is expected to cover a portion of 
these losses, it is not likely that all of the workers had taken out 
private life-insurance policies. The earnings losses sustained by 
the workers’ families will be partially covered by various 
charitable funds. In addition, the families of all World Trade 
Center attack victims will be eligible to receive compensation 
under the federal Victim Compensation Fund.8 Although these 
various payments will partially offset losses to families and 
individuals, they do not reduce the overall cost of the attack 
because those payments represent costs to other parties, such as 
the government and insurance companies.
Employment Disruptions
In addition to the loss of lives, the attack on the World Trade 
Center had a dramatic disruptive effect on employment in New 
York City. The number of private-sector workers started to decline 
at the beginning of 2001 because of national and local business 
cycles. The level of employment bottomed out in March 2002 and 
edged up during the second quarter of the year (Chart 1). From 
the peak in employment in December 2000 to the trough in March 
2002, the number of people working in New York City’s private 
sector fell by 147,000, or 4.6 percent. (By comparison, the number 
of private-sector jobs lost during the 1989-92 recession was 
344,000, or 11.4 percent.) In this section, we estimate the number 
of jobs lost because of the attack separately from those jobs lost 
because of the business cycle.
More than one-third of the net job losses in the recent 
downturn—specifically, 55,000 of the 147,000—occurred 
between January and September 2001. However, the sharpest FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 7
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Note: See Appendix B for methodology and a full explanation.
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New York City Initial Jobless Claims
Net change in thousands from a year earlier
drop was in October 2001: a record 51,000 private-sector jobs 
were lost in that month alone. The remaining 41,000 job losses 
of the peak-to-trough decline occurred between October 2001 
and March 2002. However, in the following months of April, 
May, and June, the number of private-sector jobs rose by a total 
of 10,000, or 0.4 percent.
To gauge how much of the fall in the number of jobs can be 
attributed to the attack, we use a standard dynamic forecasting 
model to estimate what the path of New York’s employment 
would have been in the absence of an attack (Appendix B). The 
difference between the actual path of employment and this 
estimated path can be interpreted as the marginal effect of the 
attack on employment in the city at monthly intervals. Using this 
technique and two alternative sets of assumptions (high-impact 
scenario and low-impact scenario), we estimate that in October 
2001, the number of private-sector jobs in the city was about 
38,000 to 46,000 lower than it would have been otherwise. In 
February, this range moved to as high as 49,000 to 71,000, then 
eased to between 28,000 and 55,000 by June 2002 (Chart 2).
Data on weekly initial claims for unemployment insurance 
seem to confirm the pattern seen in payroll employment: the 
attack’s effects on employment were substantial in October and 
November of 2001, but had largely run their course by early 
2002 (Chart 3). Prior to September 11, weekly claims in New 
York City had been fluctuating in the 7,000 to 9,000 range—or 
about 1,000 to 3,000 higher than a year earlier, reflecting a 
general weakening in the economy. The weekly volume of 
claims more than doubled in the second half of September, and 
was running 10,000 to 12,000 higher than a year earlier, but then 
retreated steadily for four months, returning to approximate 
pre-attack levels by late February 2002. Aside from a brief spike 
in late March and early April—largely attributable to filings for 
extended benefits—the number of jobless claims was relatively 
steady throughout the first half of 2002.
These employment disruptions varied across the city’s 
boroughs and neighborhoods, and across industries (Box 1). 
The most pronounced impact was concentrated in the blocks 
surrounding the World Trade Center, where numerous 
businesses, offices, and retail shops were either destroyed or 8 Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack
Employment in Selected New York City Industries
Net change in thousands from a year earlier
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Source: New York State Department of Labor.
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Box 1
Employment Disruptions by Industry
The dynamic forecasting model suggests that most of the attack’s 
net impact on employment levels occurred in October 2001. Here, 
we take a closer look at what appear to be the most directly affected 
industries: financial services, restaurants, hotels, and air trans-
portation. Together, these industries accounted for 42,000 of 
October’s 51,000 drop in private-sector employment. In 
subsequent months, although the estimated effect on overall 
employment was relatively modest, some industries registered 
further losses while others rebounded (see chart below). To get a 
better understanding of the attack’s effects over time, it is helpful to 
examine these industries and their performance. Because swings in 
employment after September 11 are far larger than any preexisting 
trends within these industries, we assume that changes in 
employment after that date are mainly attributable to the attack.
The financial services industry appears to have been the most 
directly affected sector by far. In New York City, the number of 
jobs in the securities industry fell by 12,000, or 7 percent, in 
October 2001, and by an additional 6,000 from October 2001 to 
June 2002. In addition, the banking industry saw a net job loss of 
8,000, or 8 percent, in October and lost another 1,000 jobs 
through June 2002. Net job losses in these key financial industries 
totaled 20,000 in October and another 7,000 through June 2002. 
Because some of the loss reflected a relocation of operations to 
nearby suburbs—mostly northern New Jersey—this figure 
overstates the net impact on the metropolitan area overall (see 
chart at right).
The restaurant industry also sustained steep job losses 
immediately following the attack. For the city overall, the number 
of jobs at bars and restaurants—which was imperceptibly affected 
at the national level—fell by an estimated 9,000 (6 percent) in 
October, but rebounded fully by December and held steady up to 
June 2002. However, these are net changes and do not capture the 
geographical distribution of employment in this industry. Thus, 
it is not clear if restaurant employment in the areas closest to the 
World Trade Center—the Financial District, Tribeca, and 
Chinatown—has fully rebounded to pre-attack levels.
The hotel industry lost an estimated 6,000 jobs, or 15 percent, 
citywide between September 2001 and March 2002. This reflected 
the drop-off in tourism, although 5,000 of those jobs were lost in 
October alone. In April 2002, the number of hotel jobs rose 
markedly by an estimated 4,000 and held steady in May at about 
5 percent below pre-attack levels. Nationally, hotel industry 
employment has fallen by a more modest 4 percent since 
September 2001, but has yet to show any sign of bottoming out.
The steep decline in the number of people traveling also led to 
job losses in areas away from the World Trade Center site—in 
particular, at John F. Kennedy International Airport and 
LaGuardia Airport, both in the borough of Queens. The number 
of jobs in the city’s air transportation industry fell by about 
11,000, or 20 percent. Almost all of this decline occurred in 
October and November 2001, and there has been no sign of a 
rebound. Nationally, the number of jobs in this industry fell by 
10 percent, with losses spread over the fourth quarter of 2001.
Although other industries, such as business services, apparel 
manufacturing, printing, and publishing, were also presumably 
affected, largely because of their strong concentration in Lower 
Manhattan, there is no indication of any significant shift in 
employment trends following September 11. However, it should 
be noted that many business owners and workers who did not 
lose their jobs evidently suffered income losses because of the 
disruptions in the weeks and months immediately following the 
attack. This is of particular concern in the restaurant and apparel 
industries, where workers’ pay depends on business volume.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 9
badly damaged. Substantial employment effects were also felt 
in the whole of Lower Manhattan (south of Canal Street 
[Appendix A]), where transportation access was curtailed and 
the volume of customer traffic fell precipitously. However, 
because of the drop-off in tourism—as well as possible 
multiplier effects from the loss of finance jobs—businesses 
throughout the city suffered because of the attack. For example, 
John F. Kennedy International Airport and LaGuardia Airport 
(both in the borough of Queens) saw, as did related businesses, 
a sharp decline in employment in the fourth quarter of 2001.
It is less clear whether the job losses were across all income 
levels. One might hypothesize that low-skilled, low-paid 
workers were more at risk of losing their jobs; labor economists 
generally maintain that the workers with the least job-specific 
skills are the first to be laid off in times of economic stress. 
Indeed, many of the workers in the hard-hit restaurant and 
retail sectors are relatively low-paid.9 To test the hypothesis 
that the city’s low-wage workforce faced a higher incidence of 
attack-related job loss than high-wage workers, we compare 
three industries where most employees are relatively well 
paid with three other industries where most employees 
are relatively poorly paid.10 Both the high- and low-wage 
industries experienced a range of employment declines. 
Employees in the (low-wage) hotel and (high-wage) brokerage 
industries were especially affected. However, those in the 
(low-wage) general merchandise store and (high-wage) legal 
industries maintained previous employment trends. This 
example, although limited, does not support the hypothesis 
that the September 11 attack caused disproportionate job 
losses in low-wage industries.
The attack also led to a reduction in the number of hours 
worked. A recent study of the effects of the attack on workers in 
Chinatown indicates substantial short-term disruptions in the 
restaurant and garment industries.11 Restaurants faced 
particularly severe declines in business volume in the weeks 
following the attack. These declines appear to have affected the 
number of hours worked as well as the number of jobs 
available. The garment industry also reported substantial 
declines in the number of hours worked (see Asian American 
Federation of New York [2002]). 
On the basis of this analysis, we estimate that the attack 
led to a shortfall in wage and salary earnings of $3.6 billion to 
$6.4 billion as of June 2002. This estimate mainly reflects 
attack-related job losses, but also includes the reduction in 
the number of hours worked (Box 2). 
Furthermore, worker productivity may have been lowered 
by changes in personal habits, health, and confidence. Vlahov 
et al. (2002) report the results from phone interviews with 988 
adult Manhattan residents living south of 110th Street five to 
eight weeks after the attack. About 30 percent of the sample 
reported an increased use of cigarettes, alcohol, and/or 
marijuana. The same residents who increased their use of 
cigarettes and/or alcohol were also found to be more likely to 
have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major 
depression. In a related study, Galea et al. (2002) report that 
about 7 percent of the phone sample reported psychological 
symptoms consistent with current PTSD and almost 
10 percent reported symptoms consistent with depression. 
These percentages are about twice baseline values.
In addition, the New York City Department of Health and 
the Centers for Disease Control performed a door-to-door 
survey of 414 individuals living in the Battery Park City 
residential complex (next to the World Trade Center site) and 
two other downtown areas most directly affected by the attack 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002). As of 
October 2001, almost 40 percent of the sample showed PTSD 
symptoms. Moreover, about 50 percent were still experiencing 
symptoms consistent with smoke inhalation from the still-
burning fires.
Surveys of consumer confidence can also help shed light on 
the attack’s psychological effect on behavior. The widely cited 
Conference Board survey is only available by census region 
(that is, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania combined), 
but since 1997, Siena College in Loudonville, New York, has 
conducted a parallel monthly survey of New York State 
residents in which consumer confidence is reported separately 
for the New York City metropolitan area. According to the 
We estimate that the attack led to a 
shortfall in wage and salary earnings of 
$3.6 billion to $6.4 billion as of June 2002. 
This estimate mainly reflects attack-
related job losses but also includes the 
reduction in the number of hours worked.
[Consumer] confidence fell fairly sharply in 
September 2001, recovered somewhat in 
October, and then rebounded to above 
pre-attack levels in November.10 Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack
Siena College (2002) report, the pattern of consumer 
confidence suggests a very short-lived effect from the attack. 
Confidence fell fairly sharply in September 2001, recovered 
somewhat in October, and then rebounded to above pre-attack 
levels in November. It remained well above its September 
trough through mid-2002. Interestingly, although this roughly 
parallels the national trend, U.S. consumer confidence did not 
begin to recover until December 2001, a month later than it did 
in the New York City area.
Overall, the effects of the attack were quite uneven across 
industries and workers. The finance, restaurant, hotel, and air 
transportation industries in the city were directly affected by 
the attack. Moreover, there is some evidence that the decline in 
business volume in Lower Manhattan (following a decline in 
demand) also led to a reduction in the number of hours 
worked, largely in the restaurant and garment industries. More 
generally, while many of the workers in the affected indus-
tries were relatively low-paid, we found no indication that 
employees in the city’s lower paying industries were at signifi-
cantly greater risk of losing their jobs because of the attack than 
were workers in higher paying industries. We did find some 
evidence, however, that the productivity of workers living in 
Manhattan may have been lowered in the immediate aftermath 
of the attack because of health problems. Nevertheless, 
Box 2
Earnings Disruptions
To estimate the marginal effect of the attack on wage and salary 
earnings, we must first come up with a reasonable assumption 
regarding the average earnings per worker associated with the net 
job shortfall. Because the industry profile of attack-related job 
losses evidently differs from the city’s overall industry mix, it would 
be inappropriate to assume that the average earnings associated 
with these job losses match the citywide average.
Although our employment simulation is based on a 
macroeconomic model that ignores the industrial profile of job 
losses, we can make assumptions about the mix of jobs lost based 
on total job losses by industry in the first few months after the 
attack (that is, October through December 2001). As indicated in 
the table, the most persistent job losses were concentrated in the 
financial services, air transportation, and hotel industries. The 
table shows two alternative estimates of the average earnings per 
worker in 2002 associated with the job shortfall. The “high-
impact” scenario assumes that all of the job losses were 
concentrated in the financial, air transportation, and hotel 
industries. The “low-impact” scenario assumes that 75 percent of 
the job losses occurred in these industries, another 10 percent 
occurred in restaurants, and the remaining 15 percent was evenly 
distributed across all other industries.
These figures, combined with the employment scenarios 
described earlier, imply that total wage and salary earnings would 
have been between $3.4 billion and $6.2 billion higher if not for 
Distribution of Job 
Shortfall
(Percent)











Finance 45 64 197,275 197,275
Air transportation 10 13 50,752 50,752
Hotels 20 23 38,986 38,986
Restaurants 10 0 20,244 —
All other
  industries 15 0 61,511 —
Weighted
  average 100 100 115,470 142,775
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The 2002 average earnings figures are based on the 2000 County 
Business Patterns data for Manhattan (except for air transportation, 
where earnings are for Queens) and are increased by 8 percent.
the attack. In addition, disruptions to Chinatown’s garment 
industry and Lower Manhattan’s restaurant industry may have 
reduced income by an additional $200 million, bringing the total 
estimated loss to within a range of $3.6 billion to $6.4 billion.a
a In the first few months after the attack, workers in Chinatown’s garment industry reportedly incurred a steep fall-off in hours and income that 
was not reflected in the employment statistics (see Asian American Federation of New York [2002]). Although income data by industry are not 
yet available, aggregate reported income was about $220 million per quarter for the garment industry and $540 million for the restaurant industry 
in 2000. Our estimated $200 million earnings shortfall assumes a 25 percent reduction in hours and earnings (of those still employed) in these two 
industries persisting for one quarter.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 11
Siena College’s tracking of consumer confidence in the 
metropolitan area strongly suggests a mitigation of these 
adverse psychological effects and a general improvement in 
attitudes in subsequent months. 
Physical Capital Losses and Damage
The major components of New York City’s public and private 
physical capital stock in Lower Manhattan that were destroyed 
or damaged in the World Trade Center attack were as follows: 
about 30 million square feet of commercial office space and 
more than 100 retail stores in the World Trade Center area, 
subway tunnels (Lines 1 and 9), the Port Authority Trans-
Hudson (PATH) train station at the World Trade Center, the 
streets surrounding the attack site, and parts of the 
telecommunications and power infrastructure in Lower 
Manhattan, including a switching facility and substations. In 
all, the resulting loss to the city’s productive capacity is similar 
to what can follow an earthquake or major natural disaster.12
Several economic and financial measures have been used to 
estimate the dollar value of the city’s physical capital losses 
associated with the attack.13 In this article, we cite publicly 
available repair and replacement cost estimates for the major 
buildings and infrastructure affected by the attack. These dollar 
values are nominal gross replacement and repair costs over a 
multiyear period and do not explicitly account for the 
depreciation of the assets or any potential offsets from govern-
ment rebuilding programs or private-insurance proceeds.
We group the main components of the city’s physical capital 
losses directly related to the attack into three categories: 1) the 
cost of the cleanup and restoration for rebuilding at the site, 2) the 
cost of replacing about 14 million square feet of office and retail 
space in the World Trade Center complex and its contents and 
repairing the damaged buildings in the areas adjacent to the 
World Trade Center,14 and 3) the cost of repairing the damage to 
the New York City subway lines, the destroyed PATH terminal in 
the World Trade Center, destroyed or damaged Con Edison 
facilities and equipment, and damaged telecommunications lines 
and equipment in Lower Manhattan.15
At the end of June 2002, the cleanup and restoration of the 
World Trade Center site was deemed complete and the final 
costs are expected to be about $1.5 billion (see table). These 
costs cover debris removal, street repair, police and firefighters’ 
overtime pay, and other forms of disaster assistance and relief. 
Most of these expenses are expected to be reimbursed by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).16
The cost of replacing destroyed or damaged buildings in the 
World Trade Center complex and adjacent areas is estimated to 
be $11.2 billion. Of this, $6.7 billion will be for rebuilding the 
destroyed World Trade Center complex, although it is unlikely 
that the pre-attack design will be duplicated.17 The remaining 
$4.5 billion is the estimated cost of repairing the damaged 
buildings. The cost of replacing the contents of the destroyed 
buildings, including the technology and fixtures, has been 
estimated to be $5.2 billion.18
A tracking of former occupants in the World Trade Center 
complex shows that tenants from about 65 percent of the 
destroyed space have leased new space within New York City, 
with the majority relocating to midtown offices. Tenants from 
about 17 percent of the destroyed space have moved to New 
Jersey. It is expected that about two-thirds of the damaged 
property in the World Trade Center area will be reoccupied. It 
is also expected that tenants from about 11 percent of the 
damaged space will relocate to offices in New Jersey.19
The losses to the public infrastructure in Lower Manhattan 
are concentrated in three key areas—the collapsed subway 
tunnel and other damage to the 1 and 9 subway lines, the 
destroyed World Trade Center PATH station, and the damage 
to and destruction of parts of the telecommunications and 
power infrastructure. The Metropolitan Transportation 
Authority (MTA) has estimated the cost of repairing the 
subway lines to be $850 million and the Port Authority has 
estimated that restoring basic PATH service will cost 
$550 million.20 FEMA funds can be used to meet these costs, 
although private insurance taken out by both the MTA and the 
Port Authority is expected to cover a portion of them.
The estimated cost of repairing the communications and 
power infrastructure is $2.3 billion, much of which is expected 
to be covered by private insurance and FEMA funds. 
Improvements to the infrastructure in Lower Manhattan will 
likely be undertaken, and the final bill, including these 
improvements, may well be significantly larger. The estimated 
total replacement and repair cost for these parts of the city’s 
infrastructure is $3.7 billion. Although private insurance and 
funds allocated through FEMA will substantially offset much of 
the cost of these rebuilding efforts to New York City residents 
and businesses, the productive potential of the city was 
significantly reduced by the attack and will remain below its 
pre-attack level until the rebuilding is largely completed.
Aggregating the cost estimates for each of these 
components shows the total physical losses sustained in the 
attack to be about $21.6 billion.21 To put this amount in 
perspective, it is equivalent to about 9 percent of the total 
earnings in New York City in 2000, or an average of $2,650 per 12 Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack
city resident. As we have observed, private insurance is 
expected to cover a significant amount of these losses, and 
FEMA funds appear to be sufficient to cover a substantial 
share of the uninsured public infrastructure costs. Of course, 
this coverage mitigates the cost to New York City residents but 
not to the nation as a whole.
These estimated replacement costs of the physical losses are 
based on the assumption that the reconstruction of the World 
 
Impact of the World Trade Center Attack on New York City as of June 2002
Impact Estimated Magnitude Notes
Labor market
Loss of human life Estimated 2,780 workers, 
$7.8 billion lifetime-earnings loss
Losses estimated as present discounted value of 
lifetime earnings; federal Victim Compensation Fund 
set up to help offset earnings losses and psychological 
impacts on families
Net job losses 38,000-46,000 in October 2001, rising to 
49,000-71,000 by February 2002, diminishing to 
28,000-55,000 by June 2002
Most of the employment losses related to the attack 
were in finance, airlines, hotels, and restaurants
Net earnings losses $3.6 billion to $6.4 billion between September 2001 
and June 2002
Based on estimates of net job losses and reduced hours
Attack-related productivity effects Some increase in post-traumatic stress disorder and 
alcohol and drug use three months after attack
Difficult to quantify attack’s impact on workers’ 
mental and physical disabilities 
Total labor loss $11.4 billion-$14.2 billion
Physical capital 
Cleanup and site restoration $1.5 billion Completed June 2002; expenses covered by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Destroyed buildings in World Trade 
  Center complex
Approximately 14 million square feet,
$6.7 billion to rebuild
Book value of towers at $3.5 billion; complex 
privately insured
Damaged buildings in World Trade 
  Center area
Approximately 15 million square feet,
$4.5 billion
Inclusion of damage to Class B and C space raises 
estimate to 21 million square feet
Contents of buildings in World Trade 
  Center complex








Estimated repair cost; significant offset from private 
insurance and/or FEMA for repair to all three 
components of infrastructure
Total capital loss $21.6 billion
Total (labor, capital) loss $33 billion-$36 billion
Notes: The rounding of the total (labor and capital) loss figure acknowledges imprecision in the estimates. On the one hand, estimates of the labor loss may 
be understated, primarily for two reasons: the June 2002 cutoff for estimating earnings impacts and the possible earnings reductions due to a drop in the 
number of hours worked (in industries other than apparel and restaurants). In addition, attack-related declines in worker productivity (due, for example, to 
stress) may have affected employed workers and are not captured in our estimated earnings losses associated with declines in employment and hours. On the 
other hand, estimates of the labor loss may be overstated, because of the double counting of the earnings losses of some of the deceased workers and the 
assumption that the deceased workers would have worked in New York City until retirement. Furthermore, although this earnings-loss tally corresponds to 
New York City proper, these figures will overstate the net impact on the broader metropolitan area and the nation because many of the job “losses” reflect job 
relocations from the city to the suburbs—largely northern New Jersey. Because these are aggregate loss estimates, the issue of distributional impacts is not 
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Trade Center area will essentially duplicate what existed before 
the attack. However, as of June 2002, a final reconstruction 
plan has not yet been reached and the subject remains under 
discussion. 
The Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC), 
a public corporation with both city- and state-appointed 
members, is helping to coordinate the redevelopment of the 
site. The corporation has been soliciting from various advisory 
boards ideas for the redesign of the site, including putting a 
memorial to the attack victims on the site, setting aside part of 
the World Trade Center area for residential units, and 
reconfiguring the transportation linkages between PATH and 
the New York City subway lines. The ultimate cost of replacing 
the lost capital stock depends on the final decisions regarding 
redevelopment of the site.
Impact on the Office Market
One of the most dramatic and surprising outcomes of the attack 
was on Manhattan’s (and the metropolitan area’s) office 
market. Demand for office space had been weakening and 
vacancy rates rising prior to the attack. After the attack, with an 
estimated 3 percent of Manhattan’s office space destroyed and 
another 3 percent rendered temporarily unusable, it was widely 
expected that a severe shortage of space would push down 
vacancy rates and cause a sharp spike in rents. However, quite 
the opposite occurred: vacancy rates rose further and rents 
declined (Chart 4). This happened because of a number of 
factors: demand weakened more than was anticipated, firms 
had a good deal of extra space (in both Manhattan and adjacent 
areas) that they were able to sublet to displaced firms, and some 
Manhattan hotels were retrofitted to serve as temporary office 
space.
Impact on the Most Vulnerable 
The preceding two sections focused on labor and capital losses. 
In this section, we look at the effects of the attack on the most 
economically vulnerable New York City residents.
Chart 5 shows the monthly aggregate number of public 
assistance caseloads and the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York’s index of coincident economic indicators since January 
1999.22 The bulk of public assistance is made through 
One of the most dramatic and surprising 
outcomes of the attack was on 
Manhattan’s (and the metropolitan area’s) 
office market. . . . Vacancy rates rose 
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Chart 6
Medicaid Enrollees in New York City
Thousands
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; New York City Human 
Resources Administration.
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Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, a federal and 
New York State block grant program. The remainder of public 
assistance includes the New York State programs Safety Net 
Assistance and Safety Net Non-Cash. The caseloads for these 
programs are evaluated together.23
Understanding the causes of a downward trend in welfare 
caseloads is notoriously difficult (Blank 2001). The decline in 
the number of caseloads observed in the city between January 
1999 and August 2001 could have stemmed from economic 
expansion, the welfare reform incentives to reduce the number 
of caseloads, or both. Between January and August 2000, when 
the city economy was expanding, the number of public 
assistance caseloads fell 8.7 percent. Between January and 
August 2001, when the city’s economy was contracting but the 
incentives for families to get off assistance were especially 
strong, the number of caseloads fell 10.7 percent. In short, the 
attack came at a time when the number of caseloads in 
New York City was falling rapidly, despite the slowing 
economy.24 The post-September 11 data show that the down-
ward trend in caseloads is stronger than the attack’s effects.
Chart 6 performs a similar exercise regarding the number 
of Medicaid caseloads. Medicaid—a federal government, 
New York State, and New York City matching entitlement 
program—provides medical assistance to certain low-income 
individuals and families with dependent children. Unlike 
public assistance, Medicaid enrollment displays some 
coincident sensitivity to the cycle. Between January and August 
2000, when the city economy was expanding, enrollment fell by 
12,000 to reach 1,592,000. Between January and August 2001, 
when the city economy was contracting, enrollment rose by 
38,000. By December 2001, enrollment was up by 42,000, and 
by January 2002, it had reached 1,716,000.
The sharp increase in Medicaid enrollment after 
September 11 could stem from several factors. Those who were 
eligible for Medicaid but had not enrolled may have 
experienced worsening health from the attack and enrolled for 
the first time after September 11. In addition, those with 
incomes just above the Medicaid cutoff levels could have 
suffered attack-related income losses and become eligible.
However, the United Hospital Fund (2002) concludes that 
the increased enrollment is almost certainly the result of 
changes in the eligibility requirements for new enrollees. The 
attack disabled the Medicaid computer system and eligibility 
records, so New York City could not use the standard 
procedures to enroll patients. In response, the New York City 
Human Resources Administration and the New York State 
Department of Health developed a temporary assistance 
program, Disaster Relief Medicaid (DRM). DRM simplified 
the standard complex application process. Potential enrollees 
were asked only to fill out a one-page application stating that 
their income fell within certain guidelines. These individuals 
were then presumed to be eligible for DRM and received same- 
or next-day coverage.
Summary of Losses
The loss of human life and the damage and destruction of 
commercial property and infrastructure that resulted from 
the September 11 attack significantly reduced the productive 
potential of the New York City economy. Moreover, the 
attack disrupted economic activity not only in the industries 
in the area of the World Trade Center, but also in a number 
of other industries throughout the city, further reducing 
employment. 
In this article, we have assessed the impact of the attack on the 
city’s economy by quantifying the effects on the inputs to the 
production process—labor and capital. We first considered the 
loss of human life. Although no single measure can capture the 
full impact of a premature death, the computation of the 
discounted value of a worker’s expected future earnings is a 
conventionally used measure of an individual’s economic loss. 
The attack claimed almost 3,000 lives and, using this discounted 
earnings measure, we estimate that it caused $7.8 billion in 
aggregate lost lifetime earnings for these workers and their 
families. This was as much a loss to the nation as to the city.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / November 2002 15
Chart 7
Single-Family House Price Appreciation
Percentage change from a year earlier
Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
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In addition, the attack caused significant declines in private-
sector employment. Much of the job loss appears to have been 
concentrated in the finance, air transportation, hotel, and 
restaurant industries. Other adverse effects of the attack on the 
New York City labor market were also noted. In several 
industries, most notably restaurants and apparel, the hours 
worked by employees were significantly reduced. On the basis 
of these figures, the attack is estimated to have reduced city 
wage and salary income by a total of $3.6 billion to $6.4 billion. 
In addition, surveys found some increase in the incidence of 
PTSD and alcohol and drug use about three months after the 
attack, which likely resulted in time off from work and reduced 
productivity.
On the capital side, the attack caused an estimated 
$21.6 billion in physical capital and infrastructure losses. Adding 
this $21.6 billion in capital losses to the $11.4 billion to 
$14.2 billion in lost earnings yields a total loss of $33 billion to 
$36 billion. These losses include the costs of cleaning up the site, 
the replacement of the destroyed World Trade Center complex 
and its contents, the repair of the damaged buildings in the area, 
and the repair to the damaged public infrastructure. Although 
private insurance and FEMA funds are expected to cover a major 
portion of these costs, the loss of this capital is still a cost to the 
city’s economy in terms of lost productive potential.
Recovery from the Attack
As we have observed, employment in the most clearly affected 
industries has been showing signs of a rebound since March 
2002, despite little improvement at the national level and 
persistent weakness in the financial markets, which play a key 
role in driving the local economy. In terms of its distributional 
impact, the attack does not appear to have taken a strikingly 
disproportionate toll on low-skilled workers. Jobs in low-wage 
industries appear to have been adversely affected to the same 
degree as those in high-wage industries, and city welfare rolls 
show few signs of sudden growth in the months after the attack.
Moreover, while surveys have found some psychological 
harm to residents in the immediate area of the attack, 
consumer confidence in the metropolitan area had rebounded 
strongly as of mid-2002, suggesting that any widespread 
pessimism associated with the terrorist attack was short-lived 
in the New York City area, as it was nationwide. Another 
reflection of improved confidence can be seen in local housing 
markets. The market for Manhattan cooperative apartments 
and condominiums picked up noticeably in the second quarter 
of 2002, with the average selling prices rising an estimated 
3 percent to 4 percent from a year earlier and the number of 
unit sales rising nearly 50 percent.25 Similarly, selling prices of 
single-family homes in New York City’s outer boroughs and 
nearby suburbs were an estimated 10 percent to 15 percent 
higher in the second quarter from a year earlier (Chart 7).26
Additional evidence of a recovery can be found by looking 
at the cleanup and restoration of the site, which was essentially 
completed months ahead of schedule and at a cost that appears 
to be substantially less than the amount of federal money 
allocated to the city for that effort. Furthermore, a number of 
programs have been established to support the relief and 
rebuilding efforts in Lower Manhattan. The Lower Manhattan 
Development Corporation, for example, was established in 
December 2001 to help coordinate the efforts to redesign and 
rebuild the World Trade Center area. In January 2002, a federal 
compensation program for the families of all victims of the 
attack, the first of its kind, was set up, and has since started 
making payments. Finally, the federal government has 
authorized grants, tax relief, subsidies, and other forms of 
assistance since the attack to aid in the rebuilding and 
redevelopment of Lower Manhattan.
In conclusion, although New York City has clearly suffered 
a severe blow from the attack, the major disruptions appear to 
have been short-lived and conditions are in place to begin a 
recovery. At this point, the greatest challenge to the city comes 
from the economic fundamentals that have historically affected 
the local economy: the national business cycle and, in 
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Estimating the Effect of September 11 
on the Path of Employment
To estimate the net impact of the terrorist attack on the 
subsequent path of employment, one must formulate a set 
of assumptions regarding the counterfactual—the path of 
employment had there been no attack. We do this by using 
an autoregressive forecasting model that estimates the 
relationship between employment growth in New York City 
and the rest of the nation. We then use this model to simulate 
the path of New York City employment after September 11 
had there been no attack. However, there are various ways 
to specify this simulation, depending on a number of 
assumptions. To assess the robustness of the simulation 
(that is, to see how sensitive the outcome is to varying the 
assumptions), we run a number of simulations varying each 
of the following sets of specifications:
• Number of lags used in the regression: three to eight.
The number of lags used in the estimation reflects the 
persistence of movements in employment. With relatively 
few lags, employment tends to snap back to its long-term 
trend relatively quickly, following any deviation. With more 
lags, employment reverts to trend more gradually. We run 
simulations using each of the above lag structures.
• Post-September 11 U.S. data: actual, simulated.
Since it is generally preferable to use actual data whenever 
possible, we run one set of simulations using actual data for 
the United States (excluding New York City) after the 
attack. This implicitly assumes that employment outside 
New York City would not have behaved much differently 
if there had been no attack (that is, that the attack had a 
relatively small net effect on jobs outside New York City).
If one assumes that the attack did have a significant 
impact on U.S. employment outside New York City, then 
using actual data after the attack would bias the results. 
Thus, we also perform a separate set of simulations in which 
U.S. data after September 11 are predicted based on pre-
attack changes in employment for the private sector overall 
and for personnel-supply services. These estimates are then 
used in the original regression to predict New York City 
employment.
• Last actual data point used: August, September.
Although the bulk of the effects of September 11 on 
employment showed up in the October 2001 data, it is 
possible that the September 2001 numbers were also slightly 
affected by the attack. Thus, we conduct one set of 
simulations using actual September data and another 
using actual data only through August.
As it turns out, the various combinations of assumptions 
yield results that do not vary dramatically. The weakest 
simulated employment path (low-impact scenario) is 
generated by using eight lags, with actual data for the United 
States, and using August as the last actual data point (for 
New York City). The strongest simulated employment path 
(high-impact scenario) is generated by using three lags, with 
predicted data for the United States over the simulation period, 
and using September as the last actual data point.
Equations: 
 private-sector employment in New York City,
 private-sector employment in the United States 
(excluding New York City), and
 U.S. personnel-supply employment.
Low-impact scenario (simulation begins after August 2001):
.
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1. Some of these factors affect residents who are unemployed.
2. Estimates of gross city product are reported by the New York City 
Office of the Comptroller. See <http://comptroller.nyc.gov>.
3. It should be noted that different concepts of losses are included in 
this sum, namely, replacement costs of capital, lifetime-earnings losses 
of the deceased workers, and the nine-month earnings losses of those 
idled because of the attack. Although there is evidently some double 
counting of losses in the latter two categories, we assume it is minimal 
and we make no adjustment for it.
4. The difficulties and pitfalls in putting a dollar value on human life 
are discussed in Dorman (1996). In addition to using a discounted 
earnings loss method, estimates of the economic value of a human life 
have also been based on observed wage premiums for job-related 
death risks faced by workers. A recent analysis using this methodology 
estimated the economic value of the life of an “average” worker to be 
between $1.5 million and $2.5 million in 1998 (Mrozek and Taylor 2002).
5. See the New York City Office of the Mayor for lists of the deceased 
(<http://home.nyc.gov>). The average age of those who died in the 
attack was 39.9 years. 
6. These figures are based on data from the U.S. Department of 
Commerce and 2000 County Business Patterns. We obtain estimates 
for 2002 by incrementing those 2000 figures by 8 percent.
7. This method is similar to that used in the report by the New York 
City Office of the Comptroller (2001).
8. The federal Victim Compensation Fund was established by the 
federal government to compensate families of victims of the World 
Trade Center attack. A major component of the amount of 
compensation awarded to a family is the estimated lifetime-earnings 
losses of the victim adjusted for taxes, benefits, unemployment risk, 
and the victim’s share of consumption. An additional sum is included 
in the compensation award for noneconomic losses. In calculating a 
victim’s gross earnings losses, the fund assumes annual earnings 
increases of 3 percent from a combination of inflation and 
productivity growth, an annual increase related to experience (which 
rises at a decreasing rate), and a discount factor of 4.8 percent. Using 
these parameters, the fund estimates that a forty-year-old victim 
earning $127,000 would have lost $2.7 million. The ultimate 
compensation award is reduced by the amounts received from other 
sources of compensation, such as Social Security death benefits and 
life-insurance benefits.
9. Using a different methodology, the Fiscal Policy Institute (2002) 
concludes that the attack took a heavy toll on low-wage workers.
10. We used recent Bureau of Labor Statistics and Current Population 
Survey data to help identify two-digit industries where the average 
wages were toward the top or bottom of all New York City area 
industries. Within these groups, we selected three industries that 
represented a nontrivial fraction of city employment and displayed 
low wage variation across employees. We determined that hotels, food 
stores, and general merchandise stores are important low-wage 
industries in New York City, and engineering services, brokerage, and 
legal services are important high-wage industries. Although eating and 
drinking establishments is an important low-wage industry, wages 
varied across employees much more than they did in the selected 
industries.
11. Asian American Federation of New York (2002).
12. The most recent estimates of total insurance losses—including 
property, business interruption, aviation, and medical care—range 
from $38 billion to $50 billion associated with the attacks, including 
the World Trade Center, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and 
Pennsylvania, making it the costliest U.S. disaster in the past two 
decades. Prior to the attacks, the largest insurance losses (in 2001 
dollars) were the $19 billion damage caused by Hurricane Andrew in 
1992 and the $14 billion damage caused by the Northridge, California, 
earthquake in 1994 (Schaad 2002).
13. Two widely cited reports were produced by the New York City 
Partnership and Chamber of Commerce (2001) and the New York 
City Office of the Comptroller (2001).
14. About 14 million square feet of space in the World Trade Center 
complex—World Trade Center Buildings 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7—was 
destroyed. Estimates of the damaged commercial space in the World 
Trade Center area range from a low of about 14 million square feet, 
largely Class A space, to a high of 21 million square feet, which 
includes damaged Class B and C space. Estimates of the repair and 
replacement of the damaged commercial space are available for the 
Class A space only.Endnotes (Continued)
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15. The estimates presented here are largely based on those reported 
by the New York City Partnership and Chamber of Commerce (2001),  
the New York City Office of the Comptroller (2001, 2002), and the 
Independent Budget Office (2002), updated with information that has 
become available since those studies were released.
16. See New York City Independent Budget Office (2002).
17. See New York City Office of the Comptroller (2001).
18. See New York City Office of the Comptroller (2002).
19. Estimates are based on a survey of large tenants (that is, occupying 
more than 10,000 square feet). See TenantWise (2002).
20. See New York City Independent Budget Office (2002).
21. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce has estimated the property loss arising from the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, treating the loss 
as a sharp increase in the depreciation of the fixed capital stock owned 
by private business and government. The value of the destroyed World 
Trade Center complex was based on its depreciated book value as 
opposed to replacement cost. The BEA estimates the total value of the 
assets destroyed in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon at $15.5 billion. See U.S. Department of Commerce (2001).
22. Reliable welfare data for September, October, and November 2001 
are not available.
23. The 1996 welfare reforms gave recipients incentives to move from 
the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program to the Safety 
Net Assistance program. Examining the programs individually would 
confound the effects induced by these incentives with true changes in 
the rolls.
24. However, welfare caseloads may reflect a weakened economy with 
up to a two-year lag (Chernick and Reschovsky 2002).
25. These figures are based on data from appraisal firm Miller Samuel 
and calculations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
26. These figures are based on data from the New York State 
Association of Realtors and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight.References
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